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About this guide and the series
This guidance note is based on a collection of discussion paper by our partners and case
studies undertaken in Africa, Asia and Latin America for the Department for International
Development (DFID)-funded research project Public Private Partnerships and the Poor in
Water and Sanitation (R-7388 funded by DFID). Detailed reports of these case studies are
published as a series of documents and can also be found on the project webpage:
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/projects/ppp-poor/ 
Readers should consult other papers prepared in this series for more detail on closely
related aspects, in particular those dealing with:
• The PPP procurement process;
• Tariffs for the poor; and
• Regulation and the poor.
The purpose  is to determine workable processes whereby the needs of  the poor are
promoted in strategies that encourage public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the provision
of water supply and sanitation services. One of the key objectives is to fill some of the
gaps that exist in evidence-based reporting of the facts and issues concerning the impact
of PPP on poor consumers. This series of reports presents the findings and cases studies
based on both the pre-contract and operational phases of a number of PPP contracts. A
broad perspective on PPPs has been taken, and situations where the public sector is acting
in partnership, with small-scale local entrepreneurs or with NGOs employed in a private
sector capacity, have been included. 
Many bilateral and multilateral agencies seek to foster involvement of the private sector
through public-private partnerships as a means of delivering better water and sanitation
services. Participation of the private sector is also seen as a key factor in meeting the
Millennium Development Goals, particularly, Goal 7 (Ensure Environmental
sustainability) and under which the Target 10 calls for halving the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015. Furthermore target 11 demands
for significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
The number of poor people positively affected by (PPP) arrangements needs to grow soon
to meet the Millennium Development Goals.
xWho should read this guideline and the series
This series and the guide should be of interest inter alia to:
• engineers and others with a professional interest in water supply and sanitation;
• managers and administrators involved in procurement and governance;
• policymakers who are developing strategies for PPP in water supply and sanitation; 
and
• staff of private sector firms, local government officials, NGOs and CBOs who are 
involved in the development and implementation of PPPs.
This document is neither a discourse that advocates views on the desirability or otherwise
of privatization, nor does it promote particular courses of action on the basis of theory
alone. One of the most important things that the authors have done is to go and talk to
poor consumers to elicit their views. This has been crucial to their investigation of the
operational end of how things actually work - as opposed to how they are intended to
work. The evidence the authors present is based on a review of actual contract documents
and on case studies carried out through an extensive programme of site visits and
interviews with low-income consumers, public sector agencies, private sector operators
and local politicians. The richness of the data is a tribute to local partners who undertook
the actual fieldwork; their knowledge, experience and understanding of systems and
people are central to the findings the authors present. 
The principal evidence presented in the series appears in the form of process analysis and
case studies. The following is a diagrammatic representation of the different documents
in the series and how this particular document fits in with the others in the knowledge
package.   
   
This guide
Case studies/ 
Field work
Issue specific
reports Literature
xi
The series will be of particular importance to readers interested in topics such as:
• Partnerships
• Public-private partnerships
• Project design and management
• Water and sanitation service delivery
• Decentralization and capacity building
• Poverty
• Livelihoods strategies
• Social impact analysis
• Sector planning
• Social exclusion
• Gender
Teams working on the following themes in DFID may find the Partnerships series of
particular relevance: 
• Policy division management
• Drivers of change
• Human capital/ skills
• Investment/ competition
• Millennium Development Goals
• Poverty and social impact analysis
• Reaching the very poorest
• Service delivery
• Strategic challenges
• Urban and rural changes
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Introduction
1.1 Basis
The term 'pro-poor' covers not only approaches that help the poor directly, but also those
that improve overall water supply and sanitation services. Such service improvements
have an indirect impact on the poor. 
The authors have prepared this guide in order to provide guidance on the design of
concession contracts that provide pro-poor water services, and in doing so use experiences
of private sector involvement in the water sector. The authors do not attribute findings to
any specific project, and they highlight particular contractual features only in the interests
of sharing knowledge and improving services to all consumers, including the poor.
Lack of attention to the needs of the poor is not by any means a characteristic that
is uniquely associated with the involvement of the private sector. Many public
authorities have also performed badly, and this explains the present international
drive to reduce the number of those without access to safe water. Conversely, a
number of private sector providers are at the forefront of the development of
improved services to the poor. However, any private sector success in improving
services to the poor is dependent to a large degree upon the effective actions of the
public sector. This joint approach to water supply and sanitation can be termed
'Public Private Partnership (PPP)', which reflects the important and
complementary roles of the public and private sectors working together.
Alternatively, it may be termed 'Private Sector Participation (PSP)', which reflects
the role of the private sector in the provision of a public service. Both terms are in
general use. 
The discussions in this paper generally refer to the water sector, but are equally applicable
to the sanitation sector. 
The paper shows how a PPP contract can be structured so that poor consumers are not
disadvantaged, and may even be given some preference. However, the same objectives
should be achieved if water supply is provided by the public sector alone. Therefore, the
basic concepts have wide application to all combinations of public and private operations.
There is a perceived danger that, as the private sector has to be profitable to survive, there
are commercial forces that tend to maximize revenue and minimize expenditure.
Therefore, service delivery that involves the private sector may be concentrated on
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provision for higher paying customers, particularly in cases where resources of raw water
and money are inadequate. On the other hand, the serious private sector operators are fully
aware of the importance of establishing and maintaining a good reputation. Private sector
providers are largely aware of their responsibilities to the wider community, and of the
need to maintain and enhance their reputations if their business is to expand. However, it
is important that the PPP contract should address any special measures that are necessary
to safeguard the poor. 
There is a growing awareness that the public sector should also aim to be more self-
sufficient and autonomous. Many of the standard business procedures of the private sector
are being introduced to government-run systems as a result. This in turn is developing a
more commercial approach within the public sector; however, public operators should
also recognize that specific provision should be made for services to the poor. Such a pro-
poor approach should be included in operational procedures.
There are very few explicit pro-poor features identified in documents dealing with
existing contracts, but some adjustments have been made during their operation to
improve services to the poor. This paper is designed as a contribution to help to fill that
void.
The introduction of PPP does not preclude the use of subsidies, but it does require that any
such subsidies are identifiable and guaranteed.
In order to stand alone, this paper passes through outline descriptions of the problems and
potential solutions in order to arrive (in Section 6) at guidance on the structure and
provisions in a pro-poor concession contract. 
1.2 Definitions
1.2.1 The 'poor'
The 'poor' might otherwise be known as those people on low-incomes, the economically
deprived, the financially constrained, those deprived of services that contribute to quality
of life and so on. At the risk of offending sensibilities, the authors refer simply to the
'poor'. The locations in which many of these people live are, then, 'poor' areas. The social
organizations that sometimes exist are low-income communities.
'Poor' is not restricted solely to money income. Broader definitions are common. In this
paper the authors have assumed that one factor that makes people poor is lack of adequate
water supply and sanitation for households or groups. Such a situation arises possibly
because of low family incomes or because the water utility has insufficient funds. Those
most at risk are predominantly in urban and peri-urban areas.
A common feature of the poor is that there has generally been little incentive for
water utilities (be they public or private sector) to address these problems. This has
been in part due to financial constraints and the limited enhancement of revenues
that would result from investments in water provision for the poor. It is also in part
due to a lack of understanding of the problems and possible solutions. In addition,
the public sector may not be allowed to serve poor areas that lack legal status, as this
could reduce the power of government to remove illegal occupiers. 
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For the purposes of considering the inclusion of solutions to the problems of the poor in
PPP arrangements, it is appropriate initially to consider the four categories of low-income
groups listed below. These are listed together with the main factors that must be
considered in finding a solution. 
a) The poor who live in areas of informal housing (possibly generically known as
'squatter areas', "slums" or "Shanties"). Such areas usually have severe deficiencies in
social, administrative, financial and infrastructure provision. Careful integration of
institutional, social, technical and financial factors is key in finding a solution for the
problem of service provision here.
b) The poor who live in recognized (formal) but separate housing areas (possibly
generically known as 'townships'), but where the level or extent of service provision
and ability to pay for improvements is limited. Key factors in this category are
primarily tariffs and technical aspects.
c) The poor who live in city low-income housing areas (formal slums), who in theory
receive a full service. However, such people are mainly disadvantaged by an inability
to pay, and in some cases an unwillingness to pay, especially for services that may be
well below standard. Tariff aspects and improvements in services are the main factors
that will solve water supply problems in this category.
d) The individual poor who may live in any part of the community, but who simply are
unable to pay for the services, whether temporarily or over the long term. Key factors
in this category are mainly provisions for preventing disconnection and for the
provision of a 'safety net'.
The types of pro-poor actions, and the provisions that could be made in PPP contracts,
differ in some aspects for each of the four categories above.
Box 1.1. Example of informal settlement: Cato Crest, Durban, 
Republic of South Africa
Cato Crest is an informal settlement established in the 1980s on land that is now owned by
Durban Metro, who installed standposts initially and later ground tanks. Durban Water
established bailiffs to distribute water to householders' ground tanks at a fixed time each day,
following a pre-payment made by those householders. The bailiff also had a metered standpipe
on his/her property from which he/she could sell water, at a fixed price, to consumers who did
not have ground tanks. Bailiffs were paid on the basis of water sold and the number of
consumers they served/ were responsible for. They were also responsible local maintenance.
 Tanks and connections were subsidized by Durban Water. Contributions from consumers were
charged over a maximum period of 18 months  with the first 6 months free of interest.
Initially charges were made for all water supplied, but in 1997 central government decreed that
the first 6 m3/household/month was to be free. As a result, Durban Water adjusted its rising
block tariff to include a free initial block, but increased charges in higher consumption blocks
to generate enough income. However, as there was no charge to those with ground tanks or
to those who purchased from the standpipes, the bailiffs lost their main role in collecting money
and they were not required any more. As a result, Durban Water lost its direct link with the
community.
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In low-income formal housing areas (categories b and c), appropriate tariffs and other
charges are likely to be the key to enabling improved and affordable services. In informal
settlements, the problems of providing adequate services are far wider. In both formal and
informal cases, improvements are more likely if appropriate contractual provisions are
made.
1.2.2 Other definitions
A large variety of terms is used for the various entities and elements involved in a PSP
arrangement, sometimes rather indiscriminately. The terms the authors use are given
below, together with an outline of those that are synonymous or related. This is not
intended to be a rigorous or exhaustive list.
PSP
PSP is used to denote Private Sector Participation. Another term widely used is Public
Private Partnership (PPP). The former term denotes that the private sector is participating
in service delivery, whilst the public sector usually continues to own the assets and acts
as facilitator. However, such an arrangement may also be a partnership to a greater or
lesser extent.  
Contract
The authors use the term 'contract' to denote a long term arrangement (including licence)
such as concession and lease awarded by a public sector 'authority' to a private sector
'operator' and regulated by a 'Regulator'. As finalized, the contract may be known as an
'agreement'. The term 'Licence' has a meaning related to entitlement to provide services
in accordance with provisions and regulations in legislation.  
Authority
The public party to the contract will normally be a national, provincial or local authority.
The authors generally use the term 'authority' in this paper, but in the outline contract at
Box 1.2. Large proportion of poor in some cities: 
Information from a recent investigation in Kathmandu, Nepal, 
for piped water supply
Using the Nepalese government's poverty indicator - 9,000 Nepalese Rupees (NRs.) per
person per year - approximately 15per cent of the population of Kathmandu would be classified
as poor (2002/2003). However, Kathmandu has a high cost of living compared to the rest of
Nepal, leading to an under-estimation of the urban poor. 
The proportion of households that are poor was examined in a willingness to pay study. Using
a multi-faceted definition of poverty, which included income, type of housing material, cooking
fuel and self-description, the number of households in the sample that could be categorized
as poor was found to be 520, or 34 per cent. Of this group, 68 per cent had completed less
than 10 years of schooling, and 30 per cent had never attended school. Over 60 per cent of
the poor category lived in mud-based houses (compared with 35 per cent of the overall
sample), and only 9 per cent had concrete roofs, floors and walls. Fifty per cent owned a radio
and a television, while 11 per cent owned neither. The median monthly income was NRs.6000.
One third of this group said that it would not be possible to borrow NRs.3000 to 5000 from a
moneylender.
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the end of the paper they revert to the term 'promoter', which is more correct in that
specific context.
Operator
The term 'operator' is widely, and sometimes imprecisely, used for the entity responsible
for the provision of services. Synonymous and related terms include:
• Provider - a provider of services, which could be either a private or public entity. Under 
different PSP arrangements, the operator might not necessarily be legally responsible 
as provider.
• Contractor - the corporate body that is the private party to the contract.
• Concessionaire - the corporate entity to which the concession is awarded.
• Special Purpose Company (SPC) - usually a company formed and incorporated in the 
country in which the contract is awarded, and which comprises an international or 
national operator, local investors and construction firms.
• International Operator - a company with technical experience and financial and human 
resources to enable it to operate water businesses in its home country and 
internationally, often under a variety of contractual and regulatory frameworks.
• Sponsor - an operator or SPC that sponsors negotiations or a competitive bid to provide 
water services.
Regulator
In the use of the term 'regulator' the authors normally mean the bodies or individuals
responsible for the regulation of the services and economic rewards of the operator and
for adjustment to the contract/ Licence under changing conditions. The regulator would
preferably be a separate independent statutory body, but may be, temporarily or
permanently, the authority.

7Section 2
Background
2.1 Objectives
Poor households often spend a high proportion of their incomes, and incur substantial
indirect costs that are not priced (for example, considerable time), in order to obtain water
that is fit (and in many cases unfit) for human use.
In many countries, past investments in publicly delivered water and sewage services have
been inadequate, and have benefited high- and middle-income groups more than the poor.
The increasing introduction of private sector participation (PSP) in service provision has
to varying extents improved efficiency and increased investment. However, to date PSP
has made a limited direct contribution to providing solutions to service provision for the
poor.
Over the past few years practical self-help and NGO initiatives, along with some public
utility and private provider programmes, have helped to improve general understanding
of the needs of the poor; such initiatives have also contributed to understanding of the
types of actions that can be effective in improving access and services. In most cases, the
more successful means of serving the poor have been introduced through contractual re-
negotiations and programme development; such improvements have taken place some
years after the original PSP arrangement started (Box 2.1).
Research papers, case studies and guidance on actual and potential solutions to improve
services for the poor are now relatively abundant. In most cases however, PSP contracts
still contain few if any specific provisions to ensure that the poor benefit significantly
from the implementation of that PSP.
In this paper, the authors aim to provide practical guidance on the integration of pro-poor
solutions into the contractual terms under which the private sector is engaged to provide
services. The problems and potential solutions are described in sufficient depth to indicate
the possible methods of treatment. Nonetheless, the authors recommend that readers
review other sources for a more detailed discussion of possible pro-poor actions and case
studies. In particular, the Lyonnaise des Eaux (now Ondeo) publication ‘Alternative
solutions for water supply and sanitation in areas with limited financial resources’*
provides a good review of the issues and methods of approach.
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*As noted in that publication '…the drafting of clauses for inclusion in formal long-
term concession contracts represents a considerable challenge…' The authors'
objective in this paper is to take a further step towards meeting that challenge.
2.2 Forms of PSP
PSP in the water sector is taking place in a number of different forms (or models) ranging
from service contracts, through management, lease and concession contracts and in a few
cases divestiture (see Box 2.2). As the development of PSP becomes more sophisticated,
Box 2.1. Buenos Aires, Argentina
Following a competitive bidding process based on price, a 30-year concession was awarded to
Aguas Argentinas on 1 May 1993 for water and sanitation provision to almost 10 million people
in Buenos Aires. Contractual targets were set for increasing coverage, together with connection
and supply charges. Most properties to be served were charged on a flat monthly rate reflecting
their location and size; few were metered. Tariffs were subject to a price cap, and this cap was
to be reviewed every five years. Alternatively, tariff changes might be triggered by cost increases
above 7 percent. The regulatory body, ETOSS (Ente Trepartito de Servicios Sabitarios), was
established shortly after the concession.
The original water supply system had been installed in the 1930s giving full coverage to 2.4
million people. Buenos Aires is on the south bank of the River Plate, which provides unlimited
fresh raw water and allows for the disposal of wastewater. The water distribution system had
not been enlarged enough to keep up completely with the expansion of the city and was, up
until the concession, operated by the public sector. Areas of the city not covered by the water
supply system were supplied from local groundwater schemes. The public system had
deteriorated because of inadequate investment and was overstaffed (8 staff per 100
connections; this has now been reduced to 1.7 staff per 100 connections).
The privatization of water and sanitation in Buenos Aires was part of a political strategy covering
many other sectors as well; it was at the time considered a model of free market reforms.
Various renegotiations and adjustments have taken place since the original concession
contract in order to meet new external and internal conditions. Stakeholders have also
developed a better understanding of the assets and mechanics of operations, including how to
create incentives for improvements.
Under the original contract, primary distribution costs were shared by all consumers, whereas
secondary distribution (infrastructure charges) and connection costs were paid for individually
by new consumers, who were obliged to connect to any new local system. However, most of
the unconnected population had low or middle incomes and these secondary charges were
relatively high. NGOs have been active in assisting the private operator in working with
communities by training staff and carrying out social and environmental diagnoses and
environmental impact assessments. 
In the first tariff revision these charges to new consumers were increased even more, which hit
poor consumers most. However, in later renegotiations the infrastructure charges were spread
over all consumers and connection charges were made payable by instalments. Also, the
concession expansion targets were relaxed which will have an impact on the delivery of service
to the poor in the long term.
In this case then, pro-poor measures were introduced through joint efforts of the operator, the
community, the municipality and NGOs, after the contract had been awarded.
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the particular needs that arise out of widely different circumstances have led to
arrangements that will frequently be hybrids of two or more of the standard solutions.
The provisions that need to be made to improve access and services to the poor will (or
could) to some extent apply in any PSP model or hybrid, or indeed to continuing public
service - for example, by a corporation contracted to a city council. The reason for
focussing on the concession case is that this is the most common form that maximizes the
transfer of responsibility and risk to the private sector. In a political climate that is positive
for PSP to take place, a concession is seen by experts as the most desirable vehicle for
increased investment and efficiency.
2.3 The institutional context
The PSP contract (or agreement) will be between the public authority (municipal, state or
national) and a private sector operator/ investor. It is only one part, albeit a key part, of a
complex water sector's institutional and legal framework that is needed for PSP to be
successful.
The PSP is also the end result of a long process of study, planning, procurement and
negotiation that will have taken a few years. Shortcomings in either the legal and
institutional framework or the process can limit the extent to which PSP attains its
objectives.
Institutional and legal structures that have inadequate provisions to deal with land tenure,
administrative structures, representation, health and social security create problems and
make solutions more difficult.
Clearly, the public sector has not been effective in serving the poor in the past when it has
been faced with institutional shortcomings in the water sector and shortcomings in other
institutional provisions for the poor. Largely because of this, some NGOs and CBOs are
Box 2.2. Range of PSP arrangements
There are well-tried mechanisms that use the skills of the private sector in operation, namely:
• Outsourcing or service contracts for particular services;
• Management contracts to boost senior capability and introduce new concepts;
• Lease contracts to transfer commercial and technical responsibility and risks to the private 
sector; and
• Concession contracts to transfer full commercial and technical responsibility and risks to 
the private sector and, in addition, to transfer responsibility for obtaining capital funds.
Capital funds for infrastructure components (such as water treatment works or pumping
stations and pipelines) can also be obtained under arrangements such as:
• Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT), which involves assets transfer to the public sector 
at the end of the operating period; 
• Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) used for BOOT; and
• Build Own Operate (BOO), whereby assets remain with the private sector indefinitely.
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promoting improvements with poor communities. The knowledge that NGOs have of the
social, demographic and financial situation in the poorest communities can make a
valuable contribution to effective PSP.
The introduction of water sector PSP frequently takes place in conditions where water
sector policy is not fully developed or implemented. There is seldom a coherent set of
legislation (ideally a 'Water Act'), which clearly defines the roles and relationships of the
numerous institutions and stakeholders that should be concerned with the technical, social
and financial aspects of water services provision. The creation of this enabling
environment is very important, especially if the private sector is expected to take serious
risks. 
2.4 Water sector regulation
The regulation of services and financing is a specific and important element of the
institutional and legal framework, especially in cases where piped water is provided
through a monopoly market. The economic regulator has the roles of ensuring that all
consumers receive the agreed services and are charged a fair price, and that the operator
can make the necessary improvements in infrastructure to provide those agreed services.
At the time of preparation for PSP in developing countries there is usually no established
entity for this function, and the introduction of PSP is the catalyst for its creation. Often
regulation will be established in parallel with, or following completion of, the PSP
preparation process. In the interim period there may be a less than satisfactory situation
based on the notion of so-called 'regulation by contract', i.e. the contract has to be
followed during this period without any changes being allowed to take place to meet new
circumstances. 
Apart from the fact that it takes time to build adequate capacity in a regulatory body, it is
also sometimes the case that such a body's establishment is based on an idea of constant
'control' of the private sector provider. The PSP contract should encourage the
development and implementation of innovative solutions for the poor. If this were the
case, the public sector could then give the private sector the freedom to manage and
deliver service improvements.
Certain distinguishing aspects of the water sector have a significant bearing on the nature
of regulation (and of contract design):
• long planning horizons and high capital investment needs, which are influenced by 
changes in population growth and demography;
• poor information about the extent and condition of underground assets; 
• poor information about the customer (revenue) base and the extent and types of 
populations that are not yet served;
• a high environmental impact and susceptibility to changes in environmental policies; 
and
• a high social profile as the provider of a basic need for life and health.
The nature and emphasis of regulation may be different depending on the type of PSP. In
a concession contract, as the term implies, all of the necessary duties and powers to
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operate, invest in the system (including expansion to the poor) and collect revenues are
transferred to the private operator, along with the exclusive right to use the sector's
existing assets for those purposes. Other forms of PPP give less responsibility to the
private sector and more to the public sector. However, the regulator should monitor both
the public and private sector elements in such cases. 
Performance of the contractual obligations is mainly judged on outputs.  The
business information at the start of the contract is often far from perfect, and there
are inevitably numerous changes - over a 20-25 year period, for example - in the
circumstances that were initially forecast and assumed as the basis for the contract.
The contract cannot specifically identify all of the possible changes in circumstances
that will take place, but it must define how such changes will be dealt with. 
For a concession contract, therefore, the primary roles of the regulator will be to monitor
performance, and to interpret the contract and adjudicate on the adjustments required in
response to the inevitable changes in circumstances. Such an approach to regulation
should provide the flexibility and adaptability that is needed in order to solve the problems
of the poor. This wider regulatory role should be recognized in the overall legal
framework for the sector.
2.5 The PSP preparation and procurement process
The importance of an effective preparation and procurement process in achieving
sustainable PSP is described in detail in separate papers in this series.
Three aspects, in particular, merit brief reinforcement in relation to provisions for the poor
in concession contracts.
Consensus building
The provision of acceptable services for the poor involves resolution of many technical,
institutional and financial aspects amongst numerous institutions and the consumers
themselves. Effective solutions cannot be achieved without extensive consultation to
develop a consensus. In some cases changes in legislation will be necessary.
Targets and modelling
The viability, form and performance targets for PSP will be in large part established
through detailed planning, and this will include operational and financial modelling
carried out by the transaction advisors. During the preparation phase, the business model
will be an invaluable tool for exploring the options for service improvements to the poor,
and for identifying the conditions that will render those options viable. Clearly, to
maximize its effectiveness in producing the desired results, the model must include the
most comprehensive and accurate information possible on all aspects relating to the
present circumstances and future proposals for improvement of services to the poor.
The 'indicative' business model, which is based on assumptions, will provide a basis for
the evaluation of bids. When modified during negotiations to include parameters from the
successful bidder, this model will become the business plan against which the progress of
and variations to the contract will be monitored.
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Bid evaluation
In many cases in the past, bid evaluation for concession contracts has been based on a
system in which technical proposals are evaluated on a 'pass/ fail' basis. The successful
bidder is then the one - out of the proposals that passed - that quotes the lowest tariff (at
contract commencement, or in some aggregated present value form).
This approach has been derived in order to promote transparency and eliminate
subjectivity in bid evaluation. Against these advantages it can have drawbacks, notably
that operator's experience and commitment in relation to the poor may not count towards
its chances of selection, unless such experience/ commitment forms part of the 'pass/fail'
test.
Alternatively, previous experience of serving the poor effectively could be made to count
to some degree at prequalification stage. Demonstrating experience of serving the poor
could, for example, be one factor in prequalification. Those with an insufficient track
record in this respect could be excluded; however, these bidders may be new entrants that
are committed to an equitable water supply system for all, and that would soon adjust to
actual conditions.
The alternative is a more comprehensive bid evaluation based on some 'best value for
money' concept, but the evaluation rules must be clearly stated to bidders so that they can
aim at the targets set by the client. 
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Section 3
The basis for a pro-poor approach
Some people would suggest that PSP itself does not bring solutions, but rather resources,
finance and a specific approach. There is not yet the perfect concession contract, or
anything near it, but of all the forms of PSP (excluding divestiture) the concession is the
one in which outputs, rather than simply the means of achievement, are most strongly the
core objectives.
3.1 Basis for the review and subsequent analysis
Abundant literature exists on what actions can be taken in order to enable effective
solutions to the problem of providing water services for the poor. The primary objective
of this paper is to explain how the necessary actions can be implemented and supported
in the context of PSP. In order to do this, it is helpful to review the potential technical
solutions, and to analyse the social, institutional, financial and contractual conditions that
need to be satisfied for those solutions to be successful.
Solutions for the improvement of services to the poor must encompass the technical
methods available and the organizational and institutional provisions necessary to support
them. Successful solutions will be those that are both effective and sustainable. The
identification of effective solutions is mainly related to local circumstances, whereas the
sustainability of those solutions is more often related to sector-level provisions,
including institutional frameworks and mechanisms. The two requirements -
effectiveness and sustainability - have to be provided for by the concession contract (and,
where they exist, by the regulatory mechanisms).
Analysis of effectiveness and sustainability should indicate what institutional actions are
needed in order to support appropriate solutions, and the requirements in terms of
definitions, information, specifications, procedures and the allocation of rights and
responsibilities within the contract.
3.2 Conditions for success
A starting point for such an analysis of solutions is analysis of the purely technical
method, and the end point is the means of implementing those effective and sustainable
solutions. Between these points, we need to consider the inter-relationships that exist
between the local and sector levels, between the technical, financial and social aspects of
solutions, and between the contractual and institutional means of enablement.
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In order to analyse the relationships, we can consider conditions that must be satisfied (or
success factors met) in order to enable successful solutions. As noted previously, such
conditions should be met at local level in order to achieve effectiveness, and at sector level
in order to achieve sustainability.
3.3 Potential technical methods (or infrastructure options)
Detailed descriptions of technical methods are provided in literature and case studies, but
a range of the most common technical options for water supply and sewage disposal is
listed in Annex A; generally, the list is in the order of most to least sophisticated. 
3.4 Local and sector levels
In the following chapters, the authors outline the conditions that must be satisfied for
solutions to be successful, and they identify potential technical solutions. The remaining
analyses, and proposals for pro-poor concession contracts, follow the steps below.
• Analysis of the local or community conditions that are needed in order to accommodate 
and support different methods of service delivery, including provisions for a contract - 
Section 4.
• Analysis of the sector- or institutional-level framework that is needed in order to 
provide the conditions that are necessary to sustain the local solutions, and an enabling 
environment for the concession contract, including provisions for that contract - 
Section 5. 
• Pro-poor provisions for a typical concession contract structure - Section 6.
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Section 4
Local level success factors
4.1 Introduction
At the local level, success factors can be grouped under three broad headings:
Functionality - The technical solution must deliver water supply of acceptable quality
that is adequately accessible and reliable, and sewage disposal that provides acceptable
standards of hygiene and privacy.
Affordability - Solutions and charges must be affordable, and payment methods must be
designed to assist consumers in managing their limited financial resources.
Appropriateness - The solutions must recognize or address conditions in poor areas,
including mainly institutional and social factors.
Ideally, in the preparation of solutions that benefit the poor in terms of service provision,
suitable actions would be identified and conditions would be created to make those
actions effective. However, in practice, the preparation will be a combination of those
measures that are possible under less than ideal conditions.
The outcomes of the analysis of local level success factors are summarized in Table 4.1.
Another important outcome will be the initial identification of issues that are critical in
formulating an effective and sustainable contract. 
4.2 Functionality
A fully effective technical option will need to be functional, as well as affordable and
responsive to local conditions. The term 'functionality' as used here means the potential,
within the physical conditions in the community area, for each option to meet the
requirements for:
• water quality;
• accessibility of water supply;
• reliability of water supply; and
• hygiene and privacy of sewage disposal.
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4.2.1 Water quality, accessibility and reliability
With properly installed, operated and maintained systems, piped water to individual
dwellings has the potential to provide the best levels of quality, accessibility and
reliability. Sufficient water pressure should be maintained in the distribution system so as
to avoid infiltration from contaminated groundwater. Many urban locations across the
developing world have an intermittent water supply, without this water pressure
safeguard.
In formal poor community areas, piped connections are technically feasible. Individual
connections in apartment housing blocks (in some cases tenement slums) are also possible
with payment by the individuals or by the whole block.
In informal areas, access for pipe laying may be difficult. Also communities may be
moved or buildings may be improved, and factors such as these militate against the
provision of individual connections. If these consumers want house connections, the
distribution of water through overground flexible piping is cheap and easily modified in
the event of a change in conditions. However, such pipes need to be safeguarded against
damage and overground pipes are only suitable if temperatures do not fall below freezing.
Communal standpipes, individual taps at communal points, and water kiosks are all
means for providing water of adequate quality and reliability, although with higher risks
of contamination than with piped supplies. Accessibility in such cases depends on the
number of installations and on their site.
Box 4.1. Manila East, Philippines: Concessions
In 1997, the Government of the Philippines entered into two 25-year concessions, one for the
East Zone (with 5 million consumers) and the other for the West Zone (with 6 million
consumers). Prior to these PPP arrangements, the public services were run by the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), which still controls the main source of raw water
from Angat multi-purpose dam. One objective of splitting responsibility for running the system
was to create a means for the regulator to compare performance. A quasi-independent
regulator was set up within MWSS. 
The concession for the East Zone was awarded to the Manila Water Company, which has
subsequently increased 24-hour availability of water from 26 per cent to 83 per cent and has
reduced staff levels from 6.6 to 3.2 employees per 1,000 connections. 
Manila Water Company's 'Tubig Para sa Barangay' (Water for the village) programme has
serviced some 64,000 households within its area providing access to safe water to some
400,000 consumers. This scheme provides legal connections to poor communities who live in
crowded, densely populated areas where it is difficult to install conventional water pipes. Banks
of meters have been installed, to which each household can connect its own flexible pipe
leading to its property. Alternatively, cluster and bulk meters have been installed.
This programme was not envisaged in the original contract, but was agreed by the regulator
and concessionaire in response to a perceived need. It has served poor areas, increased
income to the operator and has reduced traffic congestion in narrow passages because
tricycles vending water are no longer required.
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Water vendors and water tankers can also carry and deliver water of adequate quality and
reliability, if properly organized and regulated. However, access for water tankers may be
impossible or restricted in informal community areas.
Communal wells are at risk of contamination by nearby septic tanks and pit latrines, so
present significant water quality risks, especially in densely populated areas.
Any water supply system, including conventional piped supply, can present health
hazards if it is not operated and maintained effectively.  
4.2.2 Sewage disposal hygiene and privacy
In principle, only on-plot toilet facilities provide the level of privacy that most people
would wish for sanitation.  
Full waterborne sewage disposal with sewer connections to each house provides good
sanitation if well maintained, but requires substantial pipework and uses a lot of water for
toilet flushing. The cost and the need for plentiful water make full sewerage inappropriate
for informal poor communities. Full sewerage is technically suitable for formal poor areas
and apartment blocks where sewers can be laid. However, the costs within houses and in
the collection and treatment systems of such an arrangement are often not affordable.
Condominial sewerage (see Box 4.2 for details) offers some cost savings over full
waterborne sewerage in formal areas that have appropriate housing types. In better-
quality informal areas, it may take discharges from septic tanks. Operation and
maintenance is particularly critical in such cases to avoid overflow or spillage of sewage
(see Box 4.2).
On-plot latrines can be healthy if they are designed and built to recognized standards, for
example the VIP latrine. A specialist's guidance aids the effective installation of this type
of facility. Pit latrines are expensive to build on rocky ground. In areas with a high water
table, the pit latrine can be elevated.
Public toilet blocks are sometimes combined with laundry facilities and provide hygienic
facilities in areas where improvements on an individual household basis would be
difficult. Such blocks need full-time supervision and cleaning, usually through
community involvement, to maintain the facilities in good order (see Box 4.3).
Potential options for sewage disposal are to some extent more detached from the normal
activities of a PSP operator than are those for water supply. However, contractual
questions of responsibility remain to be addressed, and the relationships between sewage
disposal and drainage and solid waste disposal all involve a closer technical relationship
with municipal authorities.
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4.3 Affordability
The main factors to be considered in satisfying the affordability criterion are:
• minimizing costs (consistent with levels of services);
• tariff structure, subsidy and credit (which should be consistent with social policy);
• payment methods (which should make payment easy); and
• willingness to pay (which depends on the service and alternatives).
Box 4.2. La Paz-El Alto concession
A 25-year concession was signed in August 1997 for La Paz, the capital city of Bolivia, and El
Alto a low-income neighbouring town. 
The contract was designed to help the poor through a number of strategies that did not always
develop quite as planned. The areas to be served were defined, as were areas that were not
to be served because of low density of population. In fact, it was found that as connections
were made the population moved in and density increased in those areas. In effect, the
concessionaire had exclusivity, which prevented services being provided by neighbours and also
had a negative effect in areas that were not served.
Coverage mandates were in terms of numbers of people to be provided with water supply and
percentage for sewerage, with full coverage where an area met certain density criteria. The
concession mandated outputs, not inputs. The fixed connection fee tended to reflect the price
of 'fill-in' connections rather than connections to entirely new areas that would be more
expensive, so no more than half could be in-fill. The operation of the concession was later
modified by agreement to respond to conditions that had been overlooked and were to be met
and those that had developed.
In order to reduce costs to poor consumers, a pilot project was started in 1998 to identify and
test innovative systems to provide water supply and sanitation for the urban poor. Condominial
systems for water pipes and sewers reduced costs to between one quarter and one third of the
cost of conventional systems. The condominium system uses small diameter, shallow pipes
laid at flat gradients in properties, yards or sidewalks, but not in roads. Maintenance and
control of the system by the operator would be difficult because of access to properties, so
responsibility is passed to house owners for the upkeep of services passing through their own
properties. Installation costs are recovered from consumers with instalments paid over five
years with no interest.
Considerable effort was put into working with the community on development of the pilot
project, including ways of making maximum use of the new water supply and sewers, along
with hygiene education/ promotion. Micro-credit was offered for installation of internal water
use facilities, mainly flush toilets, but this was not popular. Nonetheless, the number of water
and sewage facilities increased significantly.
The disadvantage of the condominium systems is that the reliability of service depends on the
community using and maintaining the system properly. Because of small pipes on flat
gradients, sewers can be blocked easily and will then flood upstream properties with sewage.
The householder in the property in which the blockage occurs is faced with the task and cost
of clearing it. Similarly, any breakage in a water pipeline will cut off those downstream until the
owner of the property with the break has repaired it. These problems are already creating a
difficult situation and will increase with time.
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4.3.1 Minimizing costs
Costs can be minimized through:
• choice of service levels and method of supply;
• technical standards adopted;
• community labour contributions (potentially for installation, operation and 
maintenance); and
• use of secondary providers for distribution (where the cost reduction would be relative 
to the costs of it being done by the PSP operator).
Minimizing costs in the technical methods of supply are clearly a further reason for
avoiding fully piped systems in informal areas. The choice of technical standards is also
connected to the permanency of communities. 
All of the factors noted above present issues that have to be resolved in a PSP concession
contract.
Clearly, the charging structure should reflect any lower costs of supply to poor
communities.
4.3.2 Tariff structure, subsidy and credit
Subsidy and credit facilities are common, especially where the charges to pay even for
low-cost services are not affordable by poor consumers. These facilities will involve
sector issues, and probably legislation.  
Potential solutions are explored in the authors' separate paper - Tariffs for the Poor.  
Box 4.3. Public toilets and laundry facilities
Public health facilities are established in many poor urban areas by operators and by local and
national NGOs. India has a well-established network of such facilities.
These are normally permanent buildings with toilets and washbasins, but they may also have
showers and areas for washing clothes. Normally a small charge is made. A janitor is in charge
to take money and to keep the facilities clean. In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the schedule of charges
is fixed. Private individuals bid for the annual operating franchise. These operators often come
from poor communities.  
In Jakarta, Indonesia, a number of washing and toilet facilities were established in poor areas
by the public sector. Each serves a part of the community, who select one of their members to
run the facility. Other adjacent sections of the community have similar arrangements. The
water supply is metered and the janitor has to charge the section of the community at a rate
that covers all operating costs plus his/her living costs. In addition, shallow boreholes with hand
pumps can provide non-potable water.
The quality of facilities depends on the original workmanship, the thoroughness of the janitor,
plus the availability of adequate water and removal of wastewater. The last two should be
accommodated within a concession agreement.
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Where there is a high risk of non-payment by consumers, it might be necessary for the
authority (promoter) to be responsible for tariff collection, with some other form of
payment (fee) made by the authority to the operator. However, in most circumstances
operators would prefer not to have to rely on payment from one source only. 
4.3.3 Payment methods
With tight family budgets and concern over the potential size of retrospective bills, paying
small amounts as and when needed is attractive to the poor. Pre-payment methods
involving tokens, 'smart-cards' and the like are used. This also enables poor people to
establish for themselves the quantity of water they can afford.
4.3.4 Willingness to pay
Willingness to pay for piped water or other supplies is particularly dependent upon:
• realization of the benefits of safe accessible water and hygienic sewage disposal 
(promoted by education as necessary);
• quality of service received;
• affordability and ease of payment; and
• availability of other free or cheaper sources of water.
4.4 Appropriateness
Appropriate solutions need to fit physical and financial conditions (as above) and the
social and institutional circumstances at the local level. These circumstances can be
defined as follows:
• permanence of the community and its physical characteristics;  
• land tenure - extent of address registration;
• community organization for management of services;
• roles of NGOs and CBOs; and
• secondary providers - existing and potential.
4.4.1 Permanence of the community or its physical characteristics
Informal housing areas may be truly spontaneous and temporary or may have existed for
many years. In both cases, wider attention to the situation of the poor may lead, in the
short- to medium-term, to re-housing or improvements in housing either on the site or on
new sites.
The expected time period over which services will be required for an area should be taken
into account in choosing the technical solutions. Where there is good reason to expect
improvements in the short-term, least-cost solutions schemes should minimize fixed
infrastructure but at the same time should use components that are either re-usable or have
a relatively short design life.
4.4.2 Land tenure - extent of address registration
In many informal areas the community has no right to occupy the land it is on. There may
be no official representation and few, if any, physical addresses.  This causes multiple
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problems of institutional support for the poor, and specific problems for the provision of
water services, for example:
• the installation of infrastructure and facilities on illegally occupied land may not be 
allowed because of implicit recognition of rights; and/or
• the registration of individual households as customers is not possible, and this will 
exacerbate the risk of non-payment for services.
The adopted technical solutions need to recognize these constraints, but at the same time:
• institutional changes should address the fundamental problem; and
• community solutions for service delivery may reduce legal and financial risks.
4.4.3 Community organization, NGOs and CBOs
In informal areas the factors considered above all point towards technical solutions that
are likely to be low-cost, possibly with shared (communal) facilities (at least for water
supplies) and possibly with services provided and revenues collected by secondary
providers. Such solutions require stronger community structures than for services to
individual households.
Particularly in informal areas, community involvement should be mobilized through all
phases of development. These phases include:
• consultation with and advice to sector authorities, and provision of information on 
local communities for the concession design phase;
• planning of service improvements to acceptable levels;
• possible labour contributions to reduce construction costs; and
• assistance in operation and maintenance.
The last two aspects could lead to lower charges, whereby the community assists the
operator to be more efficient.
The presence and activities of NGOs and CBOs can help the promotion of poor people's
concerns at the sector level, and in representation and capacity development in individual
communities.  
4.4.4 Secondary providers
The term 'secondary provider' covers a wide range of methods for supplying water.
Potential arrangements include:
• provision by private water tankers from the operator's bulk supplies outside the 
community;
• supplies bought from the operator and distributed by private vendors;
• supplies sold at distribution points, including water kiosks, by operator employees, or 
by licensed private vendors;
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• community or private organization for the management of communal distribution 
points such as standpipes, or the operation of secondary piped supply and collection 
systems; and
• privately operated septic tank cleaning services.
Secondary providers are potentially most useful where individual piped delivery and
collection are not appropriate.
Responsibilities for water quality and reliability, and ownership of revenues should be
defined. Formalization of the activities of secondary providers, through engagement
under sub-contracts with the PSP operator, should cover scope, quality and prices.
Existing private secondary providers (water vendors or tanker suppliers) are likely to have
a good understanding of poor communities and their problems. However, in many cases
such providers might turn this to their advantage through unreasonable pricing. In many
urban situations, a very substantial proportion of the population can be dependent upon
such supplies. Improving the supply can take time because of resistance from these vested
interests. In such cases, the necessary contractual and regulatory provisions should be in
place from the commencement of the concession.
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Table 4.1. Local level success factors
Factors in the success of pro-poor PSP Ref How the factors can be recognised in a pro-poor concession contract Enabling and supporting actions and provisions
Functionality
Water quality
Water reliability 
Water accessibility 
Sewage disposal
1. a) The specifications for services must allow the flexibility for appropriate methods 
to be used to suit different circumstances, especially for the poor. The range of 
methods that will be accepted should be described, and minimum standards 
defined for all potential solutions.
Preparation of adequate specifications will benefit 
from extensive consultation with communities and 
NGO/ CBOs.
Affordability
Minimizing costs 2. a) Cost-effective solutions will be promoted by the pressure on tariffs  and 
supported by flexibility allowed in the choice of solutions. Minimum technical 
standards must be defined for each potential solution.
b) The contract must define the roles and responsibilities of the operator and any 
NGOs/ CBOs or other local organizations involved with the installation, 
maintenance etc. of infrastructure for reasons which include cost reduction.
Costs are normally a direct factor in concession bid 
evaluation. Potential for cost saving to the poor could 
be included. 
Tariff structure, subsidies and credit 3. a) The tariff structure and levels at the start of the concession will be defined in the 
contract, and associated agreements may be required to define subsidy and 
credit provisions. The contract will specify the period over which there will be no 
change, and will require review or redesign of structures and levels at specific 
times or under specific circumstances.
b) The contract will provide an agreed profile of tariff increases and/or specify the 
conditions for tariff changes, and the mechanisms by which proposed changes 
are regulated and agreed. 
c) Internal cross-subsidy will be covered by the tariff structure.
d) If it is part of the concession design, the contract might include provisions for 
the payment and management of a 'concession fee' or similar mechanism, 
which might contribute to subsidies.
e) The terms and features of any credit facilities for poorer customers (by the 
operator) should be defined.
Principles must be defined that govern the basis for 
any charging for various potential types of solution for 
the poor.
This would normally be the subject of agreements 
between the operator, the authority and funding 
agencies.
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Payment methods 4. a) The contract can provide definitions for acceptable and appropriate methods of 
payment.
b) Contract performance requirements should include development of good access 
for all customers to payment points and to utility offices for help and advice. 
Willingness to pay 5. a) The concession can include requirements for surveys, if required, and for 
provision of assistance in education and awareness campaigns.
b) The design of service performance and tariff profiles in the contract should be 
such that improvements in service become evident to consumers in advance of 
any significant tariff increases.
Willingness to pay should preferably be indicated 
through surveys and consultation during or before the 
preparation phase.
Appropriateness
Permanence of community and physical 
characteristics
6. a) The geographical areas and communities, which are to receive different types of 
services, should be identified in schedules to the contract.
b) Normally such identification will be far from perfect. To accommodate this, and 
changes over time, the conditions under which the operator is obliged to provide 
services, and has the right to provide services, must be clearly defined. Clear 
definitions must be provided for 'poor' consumers and 'poor' communities.
The definitions must be such as to ensure that the 
operator is not expected to take actions ultra vires 
(i.e. that are beyond its authority).
Land tenure etc. (effectively official recognition 
of the customer)
7. a) This would be recognised in the definitions in the relevant bye-laws.
Community organization, NGOs and CBOs 8. a) Depending on the extent of preparation, the contract could possibly identify 
specific NGOs and CBOs as approved sub-contractors for the purposes of local 
system management or secondary distribution.
b) The contract should include a recommendation that NGOs/ CBOs be consulted 
in the preparation of detailed service plans for specific communities.
Specific agreements between the operator and NGO/ 
CBOs may be appropriate.
Secondary providers 9. a) The contract must provide minimum requirements (quality and price) for the 
basis for contractual and financial relationships between the operator and sub-
contracted secondary providers, and the basis for the evaluations of labour 
contributions by members of the communities.
Acceptable forms of agreement should be presented, 
but bidders could offer alternatives.
Table 4.1. Local level success factors
Factors in the success of pro-poor PSP Ref How the factors can be recognised in a pro-poor concession contract Enabling and supporting actions and provisions
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Section 5
Sector level success factors
5.1 Introduction
Sustainability, as determined by provisions at sector level, will be dependent on factors
that can be considered under three broad headings:
Inclusivity - Inclusivity means that solutions must be provided for all of the population,
in all locations and of whatever means and circumstances. It also means that all relevant
institutions concerned with development, finance and welfare must be included in the
agreement of actions. These factors must be incorporated in legislation, agreements and
guarantees and in contract provisions, which will promote and support local level
activities.
Feasibility - In order to incorporate local solutions into a stable contract at the sector
level, contractual and institutional mechanisms are required that are based on a feasible
model of development, service levels, costs, revenue security, financing and public
subsidy.
Bankability - In order to attract finance, the complete package of the contract and related
legislative provisions, agreements and guarantees must be cohesive and consistent with
the feasible project. Bankers want to see where their repayments will come from.
Sector factors are summarized in Table 5.1
5.2 Inclusivity
The main factors to be considered in obtaining satisfactory solutions are:
• effective and accurate basic information; 
• institutional preparation and co-ordination;
• operator (bidder) perceptions and proposals; and
• scope of regulation. 
5.2.1 Effective information
Good information on the water utility and its environment is essential for the success of
the bidding process and the eventual contract. The timescale for the PSP feasibility study
and preparation is often insufficient for adequate information preparation and its
incorporation into decision-making. This can lead to disputes later on. 
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Unfortunately, most public utilities that are being handed over to a private operator do not
have long-term registers of assets, including the quality of those assets. Hence it is
becoming more usual for preliminary studies to be carried out, for example to improve
estimates of non-revenue water, or to provide improved accounts data. 
The authors suggest that achievement of successful solutions for the poor warrants similar
efforts in terms of obtaining information through preliminary studies. The following main
areas could be covered.
• Information on the existing situation at the macro level
The objective of this information would be to provide a broad picture of the
demography and geography of the poor at the sector level (that is, within the likely PSP
service area). 
• Information on the characteristics and potential solutions for individual classes of
disadvantaged communities and consumers
This would provide a basis for identifying the needs of low-income groups and
potentially appropriate solutions and, in combination with macro information, would
enable the poor sectors of the community to be included in the PSP concession
requirements.
• Development of awareness and understanding at the community level
The awareness and understanding would include the importance of the contribution to
public health that water and sanitation make. It would also include the principle that
improvements would be made that might involve different levels of service and price
factors. Development of awareness and understanding would involve gathering views
on appropriate technical and institutional arrangements.
• Information on pro-poor initiatives and municipal development plans
As well as preparing information on the poor, and ‘poor’ communities, documentation
of local government initiatives to address any legal and institutional barriers to service
improvement is essential for preparation of an effective contract. Similarly, municipal
development policies and plans will form the basis for the development plan in the
concession.
NGOs and CBOs can assist in the successful implementation of the work described above.
The information and initiatives described above are essential if full provision is to be
made for the poor in a workable concession contract. It will also enable a more effective
case to be made for financial support from central government and international funding
agencies. Much of the information gathered will have relevance for the contract, in that
circumstances that are materially different from those described in bidding documents
could trigger renegotiations. The better the conditions are known and defined, the less
likely will be the need for substantial renegotiations later based on unexpected conditions
or changes.
5.2.2 Institutional co-ordination and preparation
The process described in the previous section should be developed through the period of
transaction preparation, and a co-ordinated approach by all stakeholders should be in
place by the time the concession commences.
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The overall objectives of government may include plans to alleviate the community-level
problems of the poor (their social and legal status, land registration, employment, earnings
or income support, health etc.) and to define and implement long-term programmes for
the improvement of infrastructure and housing. These plans and improvements will help
the water sector operator to be effective. However, in many cases the task of improving
poor communities will be long-term, whereas the improvement of water supply and
sanitation may be short- or medium-term.
Relevant politicians and officials can guide and assist in developing understanding of, and
agreement on, the many complex factors and relationships that need to be considered,
accepted and actioned in order to produce an effective pro-poor concession contract.
These will include:
• The principles behind a concession contract, and particularly the principle that
expectations of benefits must be related to economic and financial factors.
• The principle that there can be different levels of service and charges available to
different sections of the population.
• The recognition of the legal and social changes that are needed in order to maximize
the benefits that can be brought to the poor through improvements in infrastructure.
• The understanding that over the term of a concession contract circumstances will
change, requiring the adaptation of flexible concession targets to suit these changes.
• The understanding that long-term planning of the concession outputs requires a
realistic view of the expected development of a city's overall infrastructure, and that
the evolution of services to the poor will need to be adapted as the city's development
plans change.
• The understanding that in the short term it may be necessary to allow the continuation
of unofficial independent services. This will be until such time as the operator provides
the services to a specified level, either directly or through sub-contracts (see Box 5.1).
• The understanding that tariff structures and financing mechanisms, including subsidies
and cross-subsidies, must be developed to include equitable contributions (including
resources and actions) from all of those with an interest in the improvement of urban
conditions, including:
• existing customers;
• future customers;
• municipal authorities and state and central governments;
• public development authorities and private developers; and
• international donor institutions.
Once provision for the poor has been defined in practical service and payment terms, the
contract must be drafted to suit that provision. In addition, the institutional and financial
measures that will be essential to enable and support it must be enshrined in the
legislation, agreements, and guarantees as appropriate.
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5.2.3 Operator perceptions and proposals
It is becoming more common for operators' (potential bidders') views to be taken into
account during the process of contract preparation. Although this may be precluded by the
procurement rules of some international funding agencies (which might be financing the
transaction preparation work), it can, if properly handled, add to the effectiveness of
concession contracts.
A further point, at which valuable operator ideas and proposals can be invited and
evaluated, is in the bidding process itself. This requires careful design of the bid and
evaluation process. In many cases it has been precluded because, in the interests of
transparency, award is on the basis of the lowest average tariff only. Technical proposals
on the other hand are judged only as a statement to meet specified standards; they have
only to be cleared (pass/ fail) before opening of financial bids.
However, selection on the basis of 'best value for money' requires clear directives to
bidders as to what the client wants and an indication of any financial limitations. Without
a statement of priorities, bidders will not be able to structure their offer to match the
perceived needs of the client. The risk of preparing a bid that is too far from the client's
requirements, and therefore is unresponsive, may put off potential bidders.
5.2.4 Scope of regulation
Regulatory issues in relation to solutions for the poor are discussed in a separate paper by
the same authors. For completeness in this paper, they note that on the basis of the
foregoing points, and those in the following section, the scope of regulation must include:
• aspects of the service and financial performance of the concession contract;
• the particular conditions of contract that relate to services for the poor, where these are
different from normal utility operations;
• the relationships between the PSP operator and secondary providers (for example,
terms of sub-contracts, and price agreements or competition between secondary pro-
viders);
Box 5.1. Karachi - a failure in consultation and an 
institutional opportunity lost
Failure to consult with NGOs and CBOs contributed, amongst other factors, to the inability to
introduce PSP to Karachi in the late 1990s.
The major problems caused by unofficial secondary providers (the so-called 'tanker Mafia') were
identified and analysed by the researchers. However, it was also recognized that continuation
of these services would be essential alongside the introduction of PSP in the short term. A
'Water Act' was drafted and accepted by the parliament of the Province of Sindh. The Act
provided for the continued operation of secondary suppliers, under regulated licences, until
superior services could be offered by the proposed PSP operator. 
With the failure to introduce PSP, this opportunity to improve and control the secondary service
providers also fell by the wayside.
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• the regulation of independent providers who may continue to operate during the initial
period of a contract; and
• a role in the development of institutional co-ordination and policy-making decisions
that is consistent with a regulatory duty to promote and enable effective and sustainable
services.
5.3 Feasibility 
Specifically, 'feasibility' means a contract design that will convince a private sector
operator that the contract performance requirements can be achieved; that risks are
appropriately shared and manageable; and that the operator will be able to achieve its
commercial objectives. Some key elements are described briefly below.
• The concession must operate on the business basis of adequate income, enabling the
long-term sustainability of assets and services. This does not preclude the use of cross-
subsidy (within the utility business) or external support or subsidy provided either to
the utility or to individual consumers. (Refer to the authors' separate paper - Tariffs for
the Poor).
• The information base for the utility and the environment in which it is to operate must
be sufficient to support the objectives of the concession and must be the basis for pric-
ing. 
• The contracted rate of expansion and improvement of services must be realistic, and it
must reflect the availability of retained earnings and external financing to sustain in-
vestment, whilst maintaining acceptable business indicators.
• Business projections must assume that planned levels of service for stated areas will
not be changed without commensurate increases in tariffs or other sources of finance
to meet their development costs.
• The operator must be able to see that the projected revenue stream is dependable. There
are three major factors in this respect - the size of the customer base, tariff levels, and
recourse in the event of non-payment by customers. In order to ensure that planned rev-
enues are realized through the life of a concession, operators will expect to have de-
fined rights (not necessarily exclusive rights) to supply customers within the PSP
service area. Support or subsidy arrangements must be clearly defined in the contract
and supported by legislation where appropriate. Normally in a concession the operator
bills and collects from consumers and accepts the risk of non-payment. Collection of
customer payments by the authority on behalf of the operator, where proposed, must
be clearly defined in the contract. The authority would then take the risk of non-pay-
ment. 
5.4 Bankability
Assessment of the bankability of a proposed concession will be the concern of all those
who expect to finance it, or who in some way or another are expected to provide
guarantees. These stakeholders will include participant shareholders in the operator's
consortium (or SPC), commercial investors and lenders, international funding agencies
and government.
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Bankability will depend upon the legal, institutional and financial provisions and on the
financial feasibility of the contract. It will be expected that these factors be demonstrated
by a complete and consistent package of legislation agreements and guarantees, which
will share risks appropriately and reduce the risks of investment to an acceptable level
commensurate with the return.
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Table 5.1. Development of pro-poor solutions
Factors in the success of pro-poor 
PSP
Ref How the factors can be recognised in a pro-poor concession contract Enabling and supporting actions and provisions
Inclusivity
General 1. a) The contract must specify service level performance requirements including 
coverage, which must include provisions for all consumers including classes 
of poor consumers by area.
b) The concession performance requirements for 'coverage' must be based on a 
definition of coverage that includes appropriate solutions as alternatives to 
conventional network services.
c) The granting of the concession must bring with it the obligation to provide, 
maintain and operate services in accordance with a development programme 
in the contract.
d) The contractual rights to supply services shall not exclude independent 
providers during a period and in locations where there is no practicable 
alternative.
Effective information 2. a) Information obtained and analysed during the transaction preparation will 
form the basis for the performance targets and allowable tariffs that are 
incorporated in the contract. As noted above, these should include any pro-
poor targets.
b) A municipal development plan should be referenced in the contract and 
should provide the context for the relevant performance requirements of the 
concession. The plan would provide part of the basis for renegotiations in the 
event of material departures from assumed developments in the service area.
c) The contract must contain clear definitions of the service area covered by the 
PSP arrangement and more specifically of the 'poor' communities within the 
area. Identification of these areas and communities should result in service 
targets being well defined.
d) Information obtained during the transaction preparation should allow 
appropriate outputs, or, possibly technical solutions, to be built into the 
contract as part of the Operator's performance targets.
Information that is the basis for bidding will be included in the 
Information Memorandum that is part of the Bidding 
Documents.
Consultation and integration with local authorities is essential 
in the preparation phase. This should enable integrated and 
economically effective decision-making for the various types of 
poor consumer and the characteristics of poor communities.
Close liaison will be needed with local authorities, NGOs, etc. in 
the preparation phase, and preferably in a separate study 
before that phase.
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Institutional preparation and co-
ordination
3. a) The results will be legislation and clarity of roles of different stakeholders that 
must be consistent with both the pro-poor objectives and the commercial 
objectives of the contract. The contract in turn must be consistent with the 
roles.
Pro-poor legislation and roles should cover, inter alia:
• liaison with local authorities over access to poor areas and 
co-ordinated development;
• subsidies;
• finance;
• secondary and independent advisors.
Operator (bidder) perceptions and 
proposals
4. a) The bidding, evaluation and negotiation process can provide for operator 
proposals to be incorporated into the contract as performance requirements. 
Marketing, bidding and evaluation processes may be designed 
to recognize and reward bidders with experience of, and a 
positive approach to, serving poor areas. 
Scope of regulation 5. a) The general and specific rights of the regulator (or the conceding authority, in 
the absence of a separate regulatory body) must be described in the 
contract.
a) Rights will include monitoring of performance, which in turn may include 
specific pro-poor performance targets.
b) The contract will define timing and procedures for planned periodic reviews of 
service and financial performance and tariffs, and the triggers and basis for 
extraordinary reviews required because of changes in circumstances.
c) The contract may describe regulatory requirements vis-à-vis water vendors 
subcontracted to the operator, and any joint responsibilities (e.g. provision of 
information to the regulator) with independent providers.
Feasibility
General 6. a) The technical and financial feasibility of the concession will have been 
established during the transaction preparation and confirmed in the 
evaluation of bidders' proposals. The agreed service performance projections 
and targets will be incorporated into the contract.
Table 5.1. Development of pro-poor solutions
Factors in the success of pro-poor 
PSP
Ref How the factors can be recognised in a pro-poor concession contract Enabling and supporting actions and provisions
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Full cost recovery basis 7. a) This would be the normal expectation of a concession operator. Full cost 
recovery from consumers can be stated as part of the objectives of the 
contract, together with the stipulation that this is not expected to be to the 
detriment of services to all or any classes of customers.
b) In some cases a concession could be supported by capital or operating 
subsidy, possibly in the initial years. Conditions relating to such support would 
be included in the contract.
Sufficiency of information 8. a) Refer to item 2. above.
Realistic business plan 9. a) Definitions should be provided of the minimum urban infrastructure required 
to be in place in order to permit expansion of services in the form of 
conventional pipe networks. 
b) Requirements for the levels of service in the PSP service area, and specific 
poor communities within that area, must be defined and must form the basis 
of the contracted future tariff structures.
Table 5.1. Development of pro-poor solutions
Factors in the success of pro-poor 
PSP
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Dependability of revenue stream 10. Size of the customer base
a) In the short-term, the operator should have the exclusive right to use the 
existing assets, including the development of services in specified poor 
communities. In the long-term, rights must include supply to all of the 
population connected by a 'final' system (as would be defined in the 
contract), including extension of the system to those not initially receiving 
such a service.
b) Also in the short-term, the operator should have the right (and obligation) to 
develop and operate improved services in defined poor communities, through 
sub-contracting mechanisms where appropriate.
Recourse in the event of non-payment by customers
c) In the event of non-payment by customers, provisions must be made for 
actions that the operator might take; such actions might involve different 
treatments depending on the level of service provided or the financial 
standing of customers
Tariffs
a) The contract will contain provision and mechanisms for tariff adjustments. 
Provision is also needed for renegotiations of performance outputs in the 
event that properly justified tariff increases are not allowed.
Legislation must be amended if necessary to mitigate the risk 
to the operator's revenue stream.
Provision for changes in circumstances 11. a) Refer to 2b), 5c) and 10d) above.
Bankability 12. a) The contract must be feasible, as discussed above, and must be supported 
as described in 3a) above.
Table 5.1. Development of pro-poor solutions
Factors in the success of pro-poor 
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Ref How the factors can be recognised in a pro-poor concession contract Enabling and supporting actions and provisions
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Section 6
The pro-poor concession contract
6.1 Introduction
Incorporating pro-poor provisions into a concession contract is a delicate balancing act
between fulfilling public policy and not compromising the commerciality of the
transaction and service delivery. Though the discussion is focussed on concession
contract, it can be applied to other forms of long term contract such as lease or
combination lease and management contract.
Concession type documents have now been in existence for at least a decade. There are
also various competing styles and conventions emanating from differing parts of the
world. These have been driven by, and from, the styles and conventions of the home base
of the advisors and compilers. However, all variations are upon the same theme and all
claim to be internationally recognizable. To a large extent this is true, but it is important
to tailor the product to suit the understanding and expectations of the participants; these
include the contracting parties and also any support agencies/ lenders and particularly the
concessionaire financiers. Bankability is key to successful implementation. What may be
acceptable to a concessionaire may not be acceptable to its financier, and this in turn risks
failure of the whole process.
An effective concession contract is only the 'front-end' of substantial institutional change.
That change will be enshrined in various legislation and inter-entity agreements and
guarantees. The concession company itself will be formed and will operate under
numerous internal agreements - for example, between the international operator,
shareholders in the Special Purpose Company, financiers, suppliers and constructors. The
contract and all of the other acts, agreements and guarantees must be cohesive and
consistent in all respects, including their provisions in respect of the poor.
The authors have reviewed in earlier chapters the conditions that will be necessary to
enable a commercially successful concession to also be pro-poor. Two of these conditions
are stressed again:
• clear definitions of service areas, service targets and technical standards for the poor;
and
• robust arrangements for payment and/ or subsidies or other support for services to the
poor.
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Finally, in all respects the contract must have a firm legal basis in order to avoid later
frustration or it becoming void.
6.2 The outline concession contract
In this section of the report the authors deal only with the concession contract itself.
Table 6.1 gives a running list of contract sections relative to a 'standard' concession
contract (column 2). Each contract section contains broad clause headings (column 3), in
each of which we have noted the main features (column 4). The impact upon the
concession contract of pro-poor provisions is noted in column 5.
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Table 6.1. Outline structure and content for a pro-poor concession contract
Ref Contract sections Contract clause(s) Content and intent Pro-poor impact
1. Contracting parties
• Promoter
• Provider
The contract will define the agreement between the concessionaire (provider, 
operator) and the public sector (promoter, authority). Separate contracts may exist if 
the service area is divided between different PSP operators (concessionaires). 
Separate contracts or licence agreements may exist between the public authority and 
independent service providers.
Normally a national, provincial or local authority
Normally a consortium of an international water services operator and local property, 
construction or financing firms.  Usually the consortium company will be specifically 
created and incorporated in the country in which the services are being provided.
None
2. Recitals • The parties Definitions and legal status including declaration of intra vires (what factors come 
within the consortium's legal authority).
None
• The legal basis Statutory and institutional framework. The provision for pro-poor services needs to have been included in 
both these frameworks; it should acknowledge that certain types of 
customers will receive beneficial terms and that the necessary support 
for this has been designed (subsidy or cross-subsidy).
• The practical basis The service framework. This will include the defined pro-poor services. It will probably 
reference schedules attached to the contract in which full and 
detailed definitions will be given. The definition will be of 'the poor', the 
service to be provided and the performance levels, if different from the 
general obligations
• The objectives The parties' common goals. One of the common goals will be the provision of water/ sanitation 
services for the poor. This will reflect the provision in the service 
framework
3. Definitions • Use of terms and 
abbreviations
The terms, acronyms and abbreviations used must be listed in full and then fully 
described
Terms such as 'poor', 'services for the poor', 'poor communities' and 
'technical solutions', must all be defined to avoid ambiguity and 
contradiction.
4. General principles • General legal principles, 
including the following:
• Amendments Will note that the Contract provides for accommodation to changing circumstances in 
order to avoid frustration.
This will include the service for the poor. The basis of the bid and thus 
the contract (and vice versa) will have been established; however, 
changes will arise due to economic and political forces.
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• Third parties Normally notes that the Contract is restricted to the two parties, but should identify the 
relationships between the provider and any secondary providers and/or independent 
providers (which should be expanded upon later in the Contract).
Often third party services (either derived or independent) operate in 
providing the poor with water (and sometimes sanitation). These, if 
they are to continue (see the legal basis and statutory framework) 
must be reserved in the contract. Such reservation will include the 
operational areas, the service provided, the risk transfers, rights and 
obligations affecting the contract.
5. Appointment • Grant Normally the promoter would grant the concession on the basis of the Authority's 
Service Area. This would need to be qualified in respect of possible arrangements for 
secondary providers and independent providers. The details of the qualification would 
be in subsequent sections (8) and the schedules.
The pro-poor service must be included as part of the grant (Award of 
Concession).
• Acceptance Provider's acceptance. Will acknowledge the pro-poor services
• Term The term of a concession is usually 20 or 25 years. None
• Legal title This normally confirms the ownership of existing assets by the promoter and the right 
(of the provider) to act and to use the assets for the purposes of providing the 
services.
None
• Exclusivity The normal concession contract provides that there shall be no competition within the 
Service Area.
In the pro-poor contract this must be qualified, as noted against 
grant, above. The term 'exclusivity' would still be appropriate in respect 
of the provider's entitlement to use existing assets, extend those 
assets, and to provide all new services that require a defined and 
permanent level of infrastructure development.
6. Conditions precedent • General provider, 
promoter
Actions needed before the Contract takes effect These may include actions relating to services for the poor
7. Obligations (of the 
provider)
• Service area With reference to details in schedules, these clauses must indicate and define the 
extent of the service areas in terms of physical locations and characteristics.
The locations and extents of poor communities of various socio-
economic characteristics that are to benefit from the pro-poor 
provisions.
Division of responsibilities in areas defined for direct service to the 
poor (or poor communities) and any subcontract or independent 
service arrangements.
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• Coverage Again with reference to details in schedules, these clauses must indicate and define 
the timescale and targets for: 
the extension of network infrastructure and the connection of new customers to piped 
water and sewerage services.
The output and programme performance of extended coverage must be related to the 
Business Plan (including the operational and financial models) submitted in the 
provider's bid. Ideally, the coverage definitions and targets, and hence the business 
model, will have been based on a Municipal Development Plan. In this case the plan 
should have a contractual standing, and would thus provide a basis for controlled and 
rational re-negotiation of targets or finances in the event of material changes.
The development of separate services in poor transient communities 
as measured by population served by acceptable methods.
The extension of infrastructure and provision of appropriate levels of 
service in permanent low-income communities. 
 
'Fill-in' connections of customers in areas of existing infrastructure, in 
cases where failure to previously connect has been for financial 
reasons that are now addressed in the Contract and attendant 
agreements (for example, by means of subsidized or waived 
connection charges).
• Service Performance in 
areas of developed 
infrastructure
Details would be provided in a Schedule. The usual contract would include 
performance and timescale requirements for existing and future served areas. 
Normally this will apply to customers receiving individual supply (or sewage disposal 
facilities) through a house connection that provides continuous pressurized supply and 
complete sewage removal (or individual house septic tanks). 
Customers served through a common connection in housing blocks or tenements.
Poor customers could receive supply through other means, such as 
yard tap, yard tank, semi-pressure, communal taps, delivery tankers, 
or intermittent supply. Similar provisions could be made with regard to 
sanitation.
Only in the defined poor areas.
• Service Performance in 
areas of under-
developed infrastructure
Content and intent as for areas of developed infrastructure, including the expansion of 
the service to paying customers.
The clauses would outline the requirement for poor communities of 
various types to receive services, and the types of service that will be 
acceptable in each case.
The basis of permissible means of service delivery would be defined, 
including through a subcontractor, NGO/ CBO, or contributed labour. 
Relationships with independent providers would be defined, including 
obligations to supply water in bulk.
Details of minimum standards of infrastructure provision and type 
would be provided in a Schedule together with a timescale for 
upgrading.
8. Performance Criteria • Water quality
• Pressure, continuity and 
connections
Standards would be defined in a schedule. They should be uniform regardless of 
customer type, but could be the responsibility of the provider only where he/she is 
responsible for service provision, directly or through subcontracts.
Water quality should be uniform, but other elements may deviate with 
regard to the services to the poor. If so, they must be described.
Table 6.1. Outline structure and content for a pro-poor concession contract
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• Customer service Describes the obligations of the provider to its customers. This will include billing and 
collection, customer payment terms (customer obligations), cut off rights and 
customer rights (of service, complaint and resolution procedures). It should also 
include customer access, payment and complaint centres and a customer charter.
The poor are customers (although someone else may be contributing 
to their payments) and so they should have the same rights for the 
defined service they are intended to receive, including a customer 
charter (or variations thereof reflecting the defined service).  It can be 
politically difficult to differentiate the service, and great care must be 
taken over customer charters if they do vary
• Consultation with 
representative 
community bodies
This obligation may be shared with the promoter. The significant change from public to 
regulated private supply will have been legislatively made, but may not have been 'sold' 
to the customers. The benefits should be self-evident and if the economic analysis is 
correct, the revised tariffs should be acceptable.
Nonetheless, consultation obligations are necessary, especially with regard to the 
CAPEX (capital expenditure) works and the temporary disruption this will impose upon 
traffic and normal life. The importance of keeping customers and potential customers 
informed and 'on-side' cannot be overestimated.
Similar obligations. If representative bodies do not exist, they should 
be formed so as to provide a point of consultation; this will avoid 
issues festering and becoming political problems in the future
• Disconnection The Contract will specify rules and practices governing the rights of the provider to 
disconnect customers; this will probably be linked to an agreement that the promoter 
will compensate the provider if there is prohibition of disconnection.
Similar provision will apply. However, the cost of administration and 
enforcement is unlikely to be fully recoverable, and special provisions 
will be needed.Making examples of non-payers will only work in more 
affluent areas.
• Procurement Transfers the obligations of providing CAPEX works and/or OPEX (operating 
expenditure) services to the provider. It will include such constraints as imposed upon 
the provider.
None
• Secondary providers Introduces subcontract arrangements for provision of some services, some of which 
may be for the poor.
These may be existing arrangements (but these could also be 
proposed arrangements) providing pro-poor services that will become 
the responsibility of the provider. The terms and conditions, rights and 
obligations for such will be defined.
• Performance damages Penalty clauses must be built into the Contract for failure to meet the specified/ 
defined coverage levels and performance criteria.
Separate provisions will be required, designed to suit failures against 
the targets for the service to the poor.
• Asset management Provision for the transfer of obligations to the concessionaire for maintaining existing 
and expanding with new assets, and maintaining them in defined serviceable order.
Existing and new assets for the service to the poor will be equally 
described with maintenance obligations that should in principle be no 
different to the full service; however, in practice type and performance 
may be different. Standards that should exist at the handing over at 
the end of the concession should be defined.
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• Operational model Defines the practice of the customer base, operations and capital development of the 
concession, and how it will meet all the targets. The model introduces the expenditure 
and other resources necessary to achieve it (that is, resources other than the finance).
Operation of the service to the poor will be one of the aspects of the 
model.
• Financial model This converts the operational model into the finance (generated from revenue, CAPEX, 
loans, support and the expenditure profiles) required to service the concession. This 
will include depreciation and debt servicing and all necessary expenditure that 
produces a net cash flow through various levels of the accounting process such as 
operating profits/ cash flow and net profits/ cash flow with periodic balance sheet 
forecasts.
The financial modelling of the service to the poor will be included in 
the predictions.
• Existing assets These must be retained by the promoter, but their exclusive use must be transferred to 
the provider. All aspects must be defined, and in the ownership of the promoter (or 
use transferred by other owners).
Will be included as part of the existing asset base.
• New assets To be provided by the provider (unless any reservation, which is a contractually 
dangerous practice) and retained under its ownership for funding purposes for the 
duration.
To be included as part of the new asset requirement. Service to the 
poor will be a part of the overall service.
• Employee responsibility The transfer of existing employees and the rights of the provider to hire/fire are critical. 
This is a very sensitive issue. Private efficiency versus public policy can have a 
considerable impact upon staffing levels. The provider must be given full responsibility 
for all employees instrumental to the provision of the service, with constraints imposed 
in line with public policy.
Most of the service employees will be required whether the service is 
for the poor or not. There will, however, be a general increase in 
employment in line with service expansion. This will depend upon 
whether staff members are charged or not. The main employee 
increase might be in community bailiffs.
• Other obligations. Further clauses would include obligations in respect of taxes, audit, insurance, law 
compliance, equity capital, and provider debt limitations that would not have particular 
relevance in respect of different parts of the community.
None
9. Obligations (promoter) • Co-operation Relevant in promoting pro-active approach. 
Promoter should have resolved/ be contracted to resolve any issues such as land 
tenure so as to enable the provider to fulfil its service obligations.
Promoter may be required to engage in public education/ awareness campaigns as 
this may facilitate revenue collection and ease the case for necessary tariff increases.
Particularly relevant in the case of informal settlements.
Establishing ownership and rights in poorer areas can be a problem.
Relevant if tariff charged.
• Raw water The promoter must provide access to suitable raw water in quantity and of defined 
quality parameters. There should also be mechanisms for adjusting service and 
performance levels and/or tariffs should there be shortfalls/ changes. Sources and 
constraints must be described.
Unless there is an acute shortage of raw water, there should be no 
need for special provisions
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• Easements, rights of 
way, construction 
permits and planning 
matters
These are a major contributor to delay is the provision of the necessary permits and 
permissions to allow CAPEX works to proceed expeditiously. The provider will be 
obligated to provide the necessary programming and proper applications, but the risk 
of unreasonable rejection remains with the promoter. If the risk is transferred to the 
provider, there may be a significant premium affecting tariffs.
Part of the service, but questions of land ownership may be an issue
• Retained functions Any function to be retained by the promoter (or through the promoter by others) must 
be defined.
Unlikely to be of particular relevance, except in terms of direct subsidy 
payment to poor.
10. Representations and 
Warranties (of the 
provider)
• Legal provisions These cover declarations of propriety and performance warranties. Unlikely to be of particular relevance.
11. Representations and 
Warranties (of the 
promoter)
• Legal provisions The mirrored provisions Unlikely to be of particular relevance.
12. Indemnities and 
guarantees
• From provider
• From promoter
• Procedures
These underwrite the representations and warranties in callable financial form, 
including performance bonds as appropriate.
May be relevant in respect of responsibilities for secondary providers.
13. Transfer arrangements • Employees
• Unions
• Terms and conditions
• Cultural change
• Revenues liabilities, 
inventory and the like
This defines the freedom and constraints of the provider in its employment policy (and 
there may be geared levels of employment), marrying the objectives of private sector 
efficiency with public policy. A sensitive issue requiring full and careful elaboration.
Not likely to be directly relevant.
14. Regulation • Regulator office As regulation cannot be through the contract for a long duration concession; the 
regulator office, resources and payment thereof needs creating and including. Usually 
payment for regulation through the contract by way of concession fee, or surcharge on 
tariffs, or may be paid by promoter
Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
• Methodology Defines how the regulator or regulatory body will operate. Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
• Powers and obligations These will be defined in detail. Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
• Regulation of 
independent providers
If appropriate; similarly the powers and obligations will need to be defined and the 
impact upon the provider mitigated.
Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
• Funding By the provider or the promoter or both. Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
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• Reporting requirements, 
service performance, 
financial
Defines in detail the reporting required by the provider (content and timing). The 
performance criteria and achievements, and default remedies.
Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
15. Tariff and charges The contract must define the tariff structure at the start of the concession period. 
These tariffs may be fixed (or fixed within defined upper and lower limits) for a given 
period of time. Where a range of levels of service is possible, permitted tariffs for each 
should be stated.
Future tariff increases and criteria for adjusting tariffs will be agreed. This review 
process must be stated in the Contract.
Tariff changes (increases), which impact directly upon poorer 
consumers, must be vetted and agreed.
• Audit and certification Requirements, if appropriate, for auditing and certifying the provider reports and 
progress.
Will cover regulation of the pro-poor provisions
Minimum and technical standards for payment facilities should be defined. Key criteria 
might include access, and flexibility in terms of methods of payment and ease of use.
The provider can be required to commission affordability studies and data-gathering 
exercises prior to increasing tariffs.
• Base tariffs The commencing (usually bid) tariff(s) from which all changes are calculated. May be a discounted tariff.
• Tariff adjustments, 
inflation, exchange and 
interest rates
The various categories of change must be defined, together with robust and 
transparent mechanisms for calculation.
May vary depending upon support levels and methods.
• Tariff adjustments, 
unforeseen events
To avoid frustrating the Contract (to give a level bidding base) and to acknowledge that 
unforeseen adverse/ beneficial events may impact upon tariffs. Again, including robust 
and transparent calculation mechanisms.
May vary depending upon support levels and methods.
• Information 
requirements
Obligation upon the provider to keep and provide all reasonable records to support 
applications for tariff adjustments.
May vary depending upon support levels and methods.
• Audit and certification Requirements may be included to ensure audit and certification of records and 
applications.
May vary depending upon support levels and methods.
• Customer charter, rate 
limits, connection 
charges
Obligations to the benefit of the customer and caps to the tariffs (subject to 
unforeseen events, otherwise frustration).
Connection charging constraints - commerciality versus public policy.
May vary depending upon support levels and methods; connections 
may be free to poorer customers.
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• Connection compulsion Usually more relevant to sewerage, water being such a necessity. Sewerage network 
expansion can be frustrated without compulsion.
Sewerage connection and connection charge compulsion may be 
irrelevant, but might be appropriate with support in whole or part.
16. Force Majeure Provisions include event definition, obligations and mitigation. Not of any more significance than for other consumers.
17. Termination (earky) Provider default, promoter default, procedures, default damages, legal title. Not of any more significance, except that poor may be less able to 
cope with interrupted services.
18. Dispute resolution Provisions include consultation, independent appeals panel, which may be final or 
arbitration/ litigation.
Not of any more significance.
19. Termination (expiry) Provisions include reversion, asset condition, inventory, moveable property, legal title 
etc.
Not of any more significance.
20. Schedules (defining) Service area Defines the geographical parameters. Includes demarcated poorer communities.
Population Per capita, per family, per household, economic-social mix (estimated if not known). Similar for poorer customers (or consumers).
Industrial base Industrial and commercial customers, and known or estimated usage of raw or treated 
(or independent) supply/ wastewater collection and treatment.
None
Assets Inventories Not of any more significance.
Coverage targets Network expansion criteria. Will include provision for the poor.
Existing projects Assets in the course of construction, type and purpose/ output, with progress and 
cost/ time to completion.
Will include provision for the poor.
Existing loans Drawn-down loans/ funding of existing assets and assets under construction, together 
with balance of loans and expiry dates (with extension terms as relevant). Also, any 
other loans, which may not be directly linked to assets.
Not of any more significance.
Provision will have to be made in the Contract for the treatment of any such loans, 
whether retained by promoter or transferred to provider, and of course for provision to 
pay back existing and new draw-downs.
Employee information Numbers, skills, costs (net and gross), unionization, length of service etc. Not of any more significance.
Financial performance Monitoring, auditing and reporting provisions. Not of any more significance.
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Service performance Monitoring, auditing and reporting provisions, including performance measuring. Will include the service expansion and performance targets for the 
poor.
Technical assumptions The basis of the bid. It will include the technical criteria upon which the bid, and thus 
the concession, is based. To be used for evaluation of change.
Will include the service expansion and performance targets for the 
poor.
Business plan The document that gives a detailed written statement of the concession objectives; 
how they will be achieved (methodology) both in OPEX and CAPEX terms; and the 
resources required in order to achieve those objectives. The financial aspects will be 
included, according to the financial model and giving the resource levels upon which it 
is based.
Will include the service provisions for the poor, itemising the cost and 
the revenue source (by tariff or support).
The Business Plan will forecast the practical and financial progress initially upon an 
annual basis (say first ten years). Thereafter, at say five yearly intervals for the 
duration, with balance sheet predictions and terminal cost/ values.
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Annex A
Categories of water supply and sanitation
A.1 Water supply
a) Individual house connections provide potentially the safest and most accessible
levels of supply, but at the highest cost of installation.
b) Yard taps can provide an adequate quality and accessible supply for formal areas. Cost
savings over individual house connections may be relatively small.
c) Yard tanks can provide good quality and effective access, but rely on intermittent
supply. They are technically more appropriate in formal than in informal areas.
d) Dedicated customer taps are provided at common points, but with access to
individual customers using smart cards or similar technology.
e) Communal standpipes can provide good quality water, but good control is needed in
order to keep the environs safe, and sufficient numbers must be installed to prove
adequate accessibility.
f) Water kiosks are effectively a technically more advance form of communal standpipe.
g) Water vending is usually an enterprise of secondary providers, who can provide an
accessible service but with potential problems of predictability, quality and price
control.
h) Water tankers are a specific vending system, either under the control of the operator
or private vendors. The same potential problems apply as for water vending, and in
addition accessibility may be difficult in informal settlements.
i) Communal wells may exist in informal and formal areas, but are at significant risk of
drawing contaminated water and of developing health hazards in their environs.
A.2 Sewage disposal
a) Full waterborne sewerage provides the highest level of removal, with individual
house connections.
b) Condominial sewerage is a system comprising aqua-privies with solids-free
simplified sewers.
c) Septic tanks servicing 10-20 households with pour-flush latrines can be appropriate
for formal areas where planning has been carried out for operation and maintenance.
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d) On-plot latrines range from simple bucket and latrine systems to cistern-flush and
pour-flush facilities.
e) Public toilet blocks (possibly combined with laundry facilities) could provide
supplementary good quality facilities.
